I will state my thesis in the way I instruct students to state theirs — clearly, directly, and with several subparts that connect logically: A focus on justice-oriented teaching is ultimately harmful to students; it robs them of time to devote to higher educational priorities, it is antithetical to how legal thinking and reasoning should proceed, and it risks imposing a one-sided view of the world onto students. I appreciate that education can never be perfectly values-neutral, but the values we should mostly be instilling are process-based values and educational values over any subjective view of right and wrong. Different teachers will balance the goals of teaching values-neutral critical thinking skills and imparting values differently, but our current trend in legal education is, in my view, favoring teaching “justice” in a way that will ultimately be to students’ and society’s detriment.
Brian Frye and Agnes Callard both recently posted well-articulated essays defending plagiarism (Callard only “sort of” defends plagiarism). My visceral response to both of these essays was “NO!” Their essays have anticipated my reaction as motivated by a desire for the academic currency of accolades, recognition, gratitude, and perhaps some form of immortality. Like any longstanding, largely accepted moral norm, the norm against plagiarism should be periodically reconsidered.
I would like to briefly add to this reconsideration by listing a few less obvious reasons for the norm. I do not discuss the obvious (and, to me, extremely compelling) reason that plagiarism is dishonest, because without a norm against plagiarism, plagiarism would not be dishonest. In that case, there would be no duty to disclose and no moral wrong in taking credit for one’s work. Please feel free to add to my list — and DO cite to this blog if you build upon my reasons.
At the first hearing of the House Judiciary Committee’s impeachment inquiry, House Judiciary Committee Member Tom McClintock asked law professors Pamela Karlan, Noah Feldman, and Michael Gerhardt to raise their hands if they voted for President Trump. Professor Karlan, who expertly taught my constitutional litigation class, responded that she has a right to cast a secret ballot. House Judiciary Chairman Jerrold Nadler then told the three legal scholars that they did not have to answer, but Rep. McClintock could still press the question. Professor Feldman rightly noted that “not raising our hands is not an indication of an answer.”
Professor Karlan appeared to be alluding to a First Amendment right not to disclose her 2016 Presidential vote, in conjunction with a fundamental right to unfettered access to voting. If experts must disclose their votes as a condition of offering testimony before Congress, this may compromise either their ability to vote freely or their desire to give their opinions on important matters. Arguably, however, the three legal scholars’ views on impeachment are undermined by their antipathy towards President Trump, rendering their votes relevant to their Congressional testimony. Federal law prohibits those who voluntarily appear before Congress to refuse to answer questions pertinent to the Congressional inquiry at issue. So, is there some sort of right not to disclose one’s vote during Congressional testimony in which one’s vote is arguably relevant to the proceedings? Unlike many areas of First Amendment law, the answer to this question relies on a balancing test that accounts for both the importance of the information to a legitimate Congress’s inquiry and the private interests at stake.
Recently, I gave a presentation that afforded me the opportunity to ponder the connection between some hot-button free speech topics: campus speaker disruptions, the arrests of two University of Connecticut students for using the n-word, and laws mandating that employers respect people’s preferred pronouns and titles. What follows is my current thinking on these topics and their relationship to each other.
More so than in the past, younger generations have the view that civilly listening to certain types of speakers inappropriately gives these speakers a platform to perpetuate their harmful agendas. The idea is that neutrality perpetuates the status quo, so champions of social and legal equality do not want to be bystanders to anyone whose views, if taken to the extreme, lead to genocide. This is not a particularly nuanced approach, given that extreme views are then attributed to those who would never endorse them. However, the approach is not entirely unreasonable, given our current cultural moment.
The problem is that these views are quite harmful to the free exchange of ideas and academic freedom – principles that are generally applicable and focus on process, not the identity of beneficiaries of particular policies, while also doing a significant amount to advance social and legal equality.
Here is my appearance on Ipse Dixit, where I discuss my latest article, First Amendment Cynicism and Redemption.
On September 19, as part of a series of protests against Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a demonstration was held in the Aurora, Colorado neighborhood of the warden of an ICE Processing Center. The warden works for GEO Group, a private company that contracts with the federal government to run the facility. Three people were arrested during the protest. Police also eventually diverted the protest by setting up blocks so protesters couldn’t follow the planned route, which looped back to the warden’s home, and perhaps intimidating protesters and journalists. Whatever your view of the propriety of a political demonstration outside someone’s home (I am generally opposed to that tactic), the behavior of the Aurora police appears constitutionally suspect.
My account of the facts is based on a conversation I had with a friend of mine who attended the protest. His attendance was based on the understanding that the protest organizers, Denver Communists and Abolish ICE, ensured a constitutionally protected demonstration. While trying to leave the protest, his way was blocked by screaming police officers. I have not verified these facts, but I trust my source, who provided the picture above and sent me video of the protest. I will proceed on the assumption that the facts as related to me are true; if there is something I am missing or have misunderstood, that changes the analysis.
Happy Constitution Day. Today is the day that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia signed the Constitution and submitted it to Congress, which transferred the document to the States for ratification. Just like how you didn’t ask to be born, but are (one hopes) glad your parents imposed life upon you, you should be profoundly grateful for the birth of this document, whose creators did not ask your permission – and likely did not represent your interests – but nonetheless imposed rights upon you.
It has become fashionable, for reasons both thoughtful and reflexive, to deride the Constitution and shun attempts to remain faithful to its text. After all, the Constitution was created and ratified by a bunch of dead, white men, some of whom owned slaves. (The 13th, 14th, and 15th Amendments were a start to remedying that moral blight and hypocrisy.) Plus, the document, by design, is undemocratic; it limits the powers of the federal and state governments and provides individuals rights as against democratic legislation. There have been calls, even by serious scholars, to do away with the Constitution, or to pack the Supreme Court to achieve a reading of the Constitution more sympathetic to certain preferred judicial outcomes. In honor of Constitution Day, here are just a few reasons why the dead hands of our Framers should still be guiding our lives today.
Here’s a draft of my latest paper for downloading. I’ve been bouncing these ideas around for a while and am glad I got the chance to think about them more deeply and systematically — and to memorialize them in a full-length article. The abstract is below.
In this article, I propose a way out of the vicious cycle of “First Amendment cynicism.” I define this term as the disingenuous application or non-application of the First Amendment to further political ends unrelated to freedom of expression. The cycle is facilitated by either accurate or inaccurate perceptions of First Amendment cynicism by one’s political opponents.
As one example, the perception by those on the political left that the right is applying the First Amendment cynically –turning the First Amendment into the “New Lochner” — leads the left to lose faith in First Amendment principles. Some on the left then engage in First Amendment cynicism, not applying the First Amendment to those that harm their agenda. This approach is then observed by the right, and the cycle continues. Further, improper accusations of First Amendment cynicism, or what I term “second-order First Amendment cynicism” render this cycle ever more vicious.
To restore both the perception and the reality of a First Amendment that serves the entire political spectrum, I first demonstrate why the increasing accusations of First Amendment cynicism are overstated and ahistorical. I then argue that the First Amendment can be both nonpartisan — treating equally speech of all political stripes — and apolitical — leading to outcomes and social arrangements that favor no political ideology. The best way to ensure that free speech doctrine remains nonpartisan and apolitical is to favor a civil libertarian approach. However, courts should ensure that the First Amendment is egalitarian in cases where the government must intervene, such as cases involving speech on government land or cases involving the heckler’s veto. Finally, I propose ways for the Supreme Court to manage its docket and refine existing First Amendment doctrine so that the First Amendment serves those who most need its protections.
The 90th birthday of political philosopher Jorgen Habermas has re-ignited a debate that also undergirds a good portion of First Amendment theory. In an age of increasing polarization and discord, scholars and laypeople are questioning whether discussions can be rational, productive, and socially beneficial. Habermas articulated a vision of “communicative rationality,” in which discussion leads to greater human understanding and rational insight. Social and cultural crisis comes when people no longer care about, as one Habermas defender puts it “intergenerational cultural transmission” or reaching understanding with our political and cultural opponents.
Other philosophers and even legal scholars take the position that more speech is not always better, does not lead to better outcomes, and does not make us more rational – because we care more about identity and emotion (or faith) than logic and evidence. Just look at Brexit, or climate change, they argue – issues where public discourse leads us away from the proper course of action. Action, some argue, is what is needed right now to alleviate human suffering, and dialog often obscures more than it illuminates. I recommend you read the highly edifying debate over Habermas and his ideas. I would like to take the opportunity, fully amenable to discussion myself, to confront some aspects of whether unfettered discourse is or can be beneficial.
In a case that may cause partisans to switch their views on free speech, plant-based food companies are suing Mississippi officials to protect their commercial speech so they can label their products with terms like “vegan jerky.”
Plant-based food companies, including Upton’s Naturals, have filed a lawsuit over a ban that prevents using terms associated with meat to sell plant-based products. According to the lawsuit, Upton’s Naturals and other plant-based food manufacturers would no longer be permitted to use terms like “vegan chorizo” and “meatless meatballs,” even though these terms are not misleading to consumers. The complaint seeks to invalidate the Mississippi law as a violation of plant-based food companies’ First Amendment rights. This case is particularly meaty because it may alter the usual political alliances generally associated with the protection of corporate speech.