Part Four: Is the Disparagement Clause Impermissible Viewpoint-Based Discrimination?
(The previous entries about Lee v. Tam, in order, are here, here, and here.)
This month, the Chinatown Dance-Rock band headlining the Lee v. Tam case released a song about its upcoming battle at the Supreme Court. The band is fighting for the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to allow its name, The Slants, to receive federal trademark registration. The PTO denied registration based on the fact that the term “Slants” is offensive to those of Asian heritage, despite the band’s desire to re-appropriate the term and undermine racial stereotypes.
To The Slants, this case is about the impropriety of the PTO’s use of trademark’s disparagement clause, which denies trademark registration to an applicant whose brand is racially disparaging. However, the case has broader implications. At issue is whether the disparagement clause itself violates the First Amendment. The case will create precedent about when the government can deny trademark registration simply because it deems a trademark offensive to a relevant group. Ultimately, this is civil liberties case about whether the government can deny benefits to groups so that the government can disassociate itself from what it deems racist messages.
Because this is a First Amendment case, much of the case turns on whether the disparagement clause is classified as a content-based or viewpoint-based restriction on speech. This content/viewpoint distinction matters because, as mentioned in Part Three, the government is never allowed to discriminate based on the viewpoint of speech unless the speech is classified as the government’s own speech. The government is allowed to separate speech based on content in the distribution of benefits as part of a benefit program, which is distinct from government speech itself. However, if the Supreme Court deems the disparagement clause not part of a government program but a direct restriction on speech (as the Federal Circuit did), then the disparagement clause cannot discriminate on the basis of either content or viewpoint unless the speech restriction is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, the strict scrutiny test. Regardless, in no case other than government speech can the government target viewpoint as a basis for speech preference.
Continue reading “Lee v. Tam: Offensive Trademarks at the Supreme Court (A Series)” →